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The decade of the i960 '8 saw a marked cyclical pattern to
the number of new common stock Issues, Within the ten year
period peaks occurred in I96I, 1965, and I969. (See Figure l)
The highest levels of common stock registrations by dollar
amounts occurred in I96I, 1964, and 1969. The cyclical pattern
of common stock issuances followed very closely the overall
economic developments of the period, and were similar to the
perforTtjance of the major stock market indexes such as the Dow-
Jones Industrial Averstge.
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The large number of new comnion stock Issues during the
1960's placed heavy depands upon the investment 'baulking com-
munity in its role as a fund raiser. Through the process of
underwriting, in its many forrrs, the issuing firms obtained
necessary capital funds and investors were given the oppor~
tunity to share in hopefully profitable enterprises. The
financial intennediary, or "middleiRan" between these two
groups, the investment banker, provided a wide range of
services that included financial advice, short-teirm credit,
and "after-market" participation.
The range of compensation received by the investment
banker is almost as broad as the services he provides for his
customers and clients. The focal point of the present study
Is non-cash compensation, sometimes referred to as "extra"
compensation. The term ''extra" refers to the fact that this
type of compensation, when used, is normally in addition to
cash compensation in the form of discounts and commissions on
the n\imber of shares purchased by the linderwriter. Other forms
of compensation received 'by the investment banker may Include
accountable or non-accountable expense allowances » commissions
on the restricted sale of a certain number of shiares to manage-
ment and employees, and the ri^t of first refusal on subsequent
offerings by the issuer.

"Extra compensation may take a number of forms. The most
common type Is a warrant to purchase shares of the issuing firs
at a particular price for a specific period of ti»«. Options
nay also "be granted by the issuing ff rm, or in soiae cases by
selling shareholders, to tho underwriter permitting him to
purchase shares of the eoiupany at a p&rrticular price. Finally,
the sale of "cheap stock" to the underwriter, at a price less
than the public offering price, nay also be an Indirect form
of compensation » Each of these devices provides some form
of eq.uity participation for the underwriter In the future
performance of the company, or at least in the future perfor-
mance of its share price. The undeiiMTiter is given an oppor-
tunity to earn amounts in addition to those received immedi-
ately for his underwriting services.
The use of these forms of extra compensation laay actually
influence the amount of casii compensation paid to the under-
writer. Where an investment banker feels that the risks are
so high in a particular underwriting as to make cash compen-
sation too high a percentage of the gross offering, he may
substitute non-cash compensation and lower his discounts from
the public offering price. The National Association of
Securities Dea.lers(NASD) performs the function of determining
just when coapensation levels are excessive.
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The Incidence of extra compensation ae a means of paying
for underifrlting services is pariiicularly high among new issues
of common stock of compaLnies that are selling stock to the
public for the first time. These are normally small companies,
often recently organized, and for i^om an issue of common stock
is practically the only means of obtaining additional long-
term capital at the time.
Obviously, many of these fledgling fiiias req;uire the full
range of services provided by the invaatraent banker. They also
represent the q2asb of securities that Involves the greatest
degree of risk to the umderwriterj the xtsk that once pur-
chased, these securities cannot be sold at a profit. These
are only two of several reasons why investment bankers who
concentrate in the area of new issues feel that extra compen-
sation is justified or even necessary to the performance of
their function. They see theiBEelves as operating in a differ-
ent risk-return ejtivironment than those underwriters who handle
only seasoned issues of wall-known corporations.
The area of non-cash coKpens&tion has been explored
by several research stu^-lies into securities markets and the
investment banking coamunity. The two most prominent of these
studies were those of the Special Study of Securities Markets
by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the study of
the New Issues market by the Wharton School of Finance and
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CoKUBerce, Limited studies of secondary iraportance have also
been carried out by the New York Stock Exchange » the National
Association of Seciurities DcaDers, and the Investment Bankers
Association of America,
While these previous efforts have varied some'jdiat in
the extent of their analysis, their findings I'savo been roughly
consistent over time. Briefly, they have indicated that, (l)
there has been a groning interest on the part of toe investment
banking community in obtaining non-cash, equity coBi>ensatlon.
This interest has reached a peak, particularly among under-
writers dealing in new iasues, during periods of speculative
excess when "hot issues" were expected to reach a substantial
preKtiuffi over the offering price within a relatively short
period of time. This is particularly significant in light of
the fact that nsany managing underwriters know well in advanoe
that they will have no trouble in selling th© issue) (2) the
incidence of non-cash compensation has been greater among
issues of analler, unseasoned conp&nias than among the larger,
more established finas? (3) tb© use of non-cash extras has not
resulted in a lower level cf cash eomaiselons paid l^ the
issuer. One does not appear to have been substituted for the
other. Those fIras paying extra compensation are those also
paying the highest levels of cash compensation? (4) there have
been acknowledged abuses in the area, but efforts are being
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mads "by regulatory agencies such as the NASD to ovexeoae the
difficultieSj andj indeed^ to reduce the potential value of
extr&s.
RESEARCH ]jESIGN
The Investment Dealers £i£est was selected as the
starting point of the investigation. Th© Mgest^ in its
semi-annual Gorpox'at® Financing Directory,, compiles infor-
mation on "all the U. S, corporate financing" accomplished in
the previous six month period. The advajitages of this tabu-
lation of financing activity are its comprehensiveness and
its consistency over time, as well as its explained variation
from other sources of similar liiformation.
More than a doasen types of securities offerings were
excluded from the study du© to th® fact that extra compen-
sation was not used in those instaae®® or was not meaningful
to the study « Aa<mg the categories ©xclMed were "best
efforts" offeringSj Bnstuml funds^ arid deist and preferred
stock offerings. The rematalBg offerings, co»c«ntrmt©d
mainly in the area of new issues of coHimoH stock, Included
the great majority of undei^wx-itinga with ©rtr&s, and also
provided a workable subset of data. This subset included
offerings where secondaries wore included as well as shares
b«liig issued by the company. (See Table l)

TkZlE 1
"QUALIFIED UNDERWRJ-^INGS", BY YEAR
1965 16.5
1966 ., 133
1967 22i^
1968 (six months) 253
The ti»e porlod fro» January 1, I965 through June 30»
1968 Mas selected for study b»cause of the variety of economic
and market conditions that prevailed during that tine. It was
also felt that enough time had passed since the end of that
period that iinderwrlters would have bad the opportunity to
exercise some of the options they had recieved. Some warrants
and options still had soa« tiae to run, however^ Undenrriting
activity also va-ried considerably during the period, but was
generally increasing i^ intensity and the nom^r of Issues
brought to resxket, 775 ie^es wyra identified in the 42 month
period. Of these "qiialified" ij»eue^, 1^5 involved the use of
non-cash extras in the undericritJjng compensation.
A quastlonr^ire m,s sent to th«:t investment leakers who
had managed the offering of these 1*^5 ieeues. Unfortunately,
a n\imber of underwriters had suffered business failures,
merged with other firms, or were in the process of liquidation.
In these instances, information had been lost or t«as unavail-
able and reduced the number of responses.

8The nu»ber of uaderwriters •srtjo had actimlly dlapoced of
their extras co»plete?y >».6 spill. In onl^ 15 of the 112
responses bad securities been oxereiaed or eoM. This mis
due primgLrily to the weak stock isarket ijondltlons that pre-
vailed for much of the period eubsequent to I968. However,
>rtien these results were coablxied with an analysis of the
many options that wer* still held by underwriters. It was
concluded that adequate data was available to carry on the
Intended research. (See Table 2)
TABLE 2
RESPONSE TO MIL SURVEY OF UNDERVaiTERS OF QUALIFIED ISSUES
Disposition of Option 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total
Still Held 5 16 39 60
Expired 1 ^ 1 2
Exercised (or sold) c 5 5 3 15
Data not available* 2 3 8 22 35
Total 13 30 64 112
Issues with "extras"
(See Table 12)
9 13
j
38 85 145
n'his category includes those issues handled by under
writers who were no longer in business, those merged into other
firms with a subsequent loss of data, or those firms in the
process of being liquidated at the time of the survey.
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9SimVSY EESULTS
The analysis of the data fms broken down into threo parts.
The first section waa essentialljr deacrlptive Material dealing
with all of the qimllfled underwrltings involving extra c<Mi-
pensatlon. Ck>nfirffied m.s th« sxp<»ctation that most of those
underwritlngs would he snail, 86^ of th© offerings with
extzas grossed amounts of three million dollars or less.
Althou^ not nomally included in the underwritingSf shares
represented Taj extras amounted to a hi£^ percentage of the
shares actijally offered for sale. And, While the initial
exercise price of warrants and options were generally well
above the public offering price of the securities, the price
discounts granted via cheap stock were frequently quite large.
The underwriting spread for the period I965-68 appeared to he
somewhat lower than it had been in th© earlier studies. (See
Tables 3-?)
The second stage of the amljsis concerned itself with
the vari.ous categories of rgjspoas© to the survey. In the
first instance, the responses that indicated options were
"still held", only 14^ would have been profitable if they
had been sold as of March 26, 1971, The majority of these
variants were exercliaibl© only at substantial over the then
current market price. Only two options had expired as of
the dates of the survey.
.•*<•.' rv •J.»t
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SxftBlnatlon of those extras that were exercised or sold
was again hroken down into three sections depending upon the
completeness of disposition. The first classifioation was that
frtiere cheap stock had been sold ox where warrants were exer-
cised and the underlying shares subsequently sold lay the
landerwriter. (See Table 8)
TABLE 3
SIZE OF UNDEKWRrrmOS WnH EXTRAS, BT TEAR
Size of Offering 1965 1966 196? 1968 Total
t 5$ # i # i # ^ # i
$10,000,000 and over
5.000 to 9.999
3.00O to 4.999
J. 000 to 2.999
^frr^OO- to- 0.999
0.300 to 0.^*99
$ 300,000 and under
1
8
11
88
mm
2
8
3
15
61
23
6
17
12
3
mm
45
31
8
3
7
33
32
10
k
8
39
38
11
15
66
16
3
to
45
30
11
Total^ 9 100 13 100 38 100 85 100 145 100
1 Percentages may not add to 100^6 due to rounding.

TABLE 4
SHARES REPRESiiKTED BT "EXTRjS.S« AS A PERCENTAQE
OF THE GROSS OFFhKim, 13T TEAR, 1965-1968
Extra shares as
a Percentage of 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total
the Gross Offer-
ing # f. # ^ # i # ^ * i
0-4^ 2 22 2 15 ^^ to 8 9 16 It
:- 5-9^ 5 55 ? 5^ 21 55 29 3^ 62 ^3
10 - iki 1 tl 3 23 6 16 23 27 33 23
15 - 19 » - 4 to 9 10 13 9
20 '2k 1 It t 7 1 3 8 9 11 8
25 - 29 » « - ^ 5 6 5 3
.
30 -
.
M> NM . 2 5 3 4 5 3
Total^ ' 100 13 too 38 too 85
,1, ,„,„,
too 145 too
1 Percentages may not add to 100^ due to rotmding.

TABIi: 5
INiriAL EXERCISE PRICE OF WARRAl^TS OR OPTIONS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF THE PUBLIC OFFERING PRICE, BT YEAR
^ of the
Public
Offering
Price
80 - 895^
1965 1966 1967 1968 Total
11 1
90 - 99 1 1 1
_
100 - 109 6 66 11 92 25 71 hk 58 86 65
150_ -
_1,10 - 119 1 It 13 4 11 15 '20 21 16
^120 - 129
.
2
. .
22
„ „..-. - 5 14 14 18 21 16
J 30 - 139 - - - WJ ...- m» - -
1^ -. 149 - -
-_
-
-
..-
-
.-..
-
.
-
1311
JotalJ
_, 9 100 12 100 35 too 76 100 132 100
^Percentages may not add to IOO5? due to rounding.

TABLE 6
PURCHASE PRICE 0? "CKEA? STOCK" A3 A PERCENTAGE OF
THE PUBLIC CFFERVNG PRICE, iSf Y3AR
56 of the
Public 1965 1966
1'~>67 1968 Total
Offering
Price # i # 7^ # i> # i # ^
0-95^ - » - - 1 33 2 22 3 23
10 - 19 - 1 100 » ^ 1 11 2 15
20 - 29 « - - - 1 33 „ - 1 8
-30 - 39 - - -, - . » 3 33 3 23
iK) - 49 - -, " » 1 11 1 8
50 - 59 u - - . "
"!
™ -
^ - 69 - - ™ 1 33 1 ti 2 15
?0 -79 - «. „ - «n « - -
80 - 89 - . - „ 1 11 1 8
Total^ 100 3 10c 9 too 13 IOC
'Percentages may not add to 100^ due to rounding

TABLE 7
UNDERl^TTING "SPREAD" A3 A PERCENTAGE OF THE PUBLIC
OFFERING PRICE FOR ISSUE,3 ;^TH EXTRAS, BI YEAR
Under-
writing 1965 1966 1967 1 968 Total
"Spread"
# i # K> # 1« # i # i
6.0-6.9 . - - 1 1 1 1
7.0-7.9 - - - - 6 16 5 6 11 8
8.0-8.9 5 56 a 62 10 26 29 34 52 36
9.0-9.9 t 11 2 15 9 24 9 10 21 14
10.0-10.9 3 33. 3 23 13 34 37 44 56 38
11.0-11.9 - „ a* <» an 2 2 2 1
12.0-12,9 - „ - - ^ 1 1 1 1
13.0-13.9 " - „ « „ 1 1 1 1
Total
^
9 100 13 too 36 100 85 100 145 100
Percentages may not add to 100^ due to rounding.

TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF UNDiiRWRITERS "SPREAD" VERSUS EXTRA COMPENSATION
Under-
writing^
Oross
Spread
••Extra"
Proceeds
Proceeds/
Spread
1 $ 260,700 $ 2.503.125 960.1^
2 188,600 175,000 92.8
3 115.500 2^2.500 209.9
i^ 306,000 500,000 163.4
5 1 if5, 000 if60,000 317.2
6 253,000 585.000 231.2
7* 220,000 ^1.888 19.0
8
. 216,000 6.750 3.1
9* 101,250 6.600 6.5
- 10 iJOI.OOO 73,500 18.3
*Much of the infonaatio: gained from underwriters involved
in this study was obtained by a guarar.tee of anonjnnity. Assur-
rances were given by the .mthcr tiiat neither the names of in-
dividual underwriters or -heir clients would be disclosed.
(*) indicates cheap stock
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While profits gained trov. extras in each of the ten
situations in this group tcere iarge in comparison with the
cost of shares* it must be renembered that these ten were
taken ftroa 145 q«alifled issues and that the qualified group'
represented only a fraction of the several hundred issues of
coioEon stock underwritten during the period.
A second category included two instances where warrants
had been sold by the underwriter as imrrsmts and not exercised.
Profits from these two cases were large considering the fact
that the initial investment in the warrants was very small.
Total compensation received by the underwriter was a high
percentage of the gross offering, and, in on© cas®„ almost
equalled the proceeds received by the issuing firre.
The final sub-category under exeirclsed involved three
underwritings whsre the invf<stment bar.k©r >»ad exercised an
option or warrants, but sms still holding the underlying
shares. Profits and degree of total aomiiereation were
difficult to judge in theso situations due to the difficulty
of obtaining information on the eventual disposition of some
of these shares, and the fact tb&t these files are still "open"
or incomplete until the shares are sold.
Finally, an analysis was aade of the different character-
istics of the issues comparing the I965-68 period with earlier
data as well as comparing each of the years from I965 through
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1968. The characteristics that were analyzed were under-
writing "spread", extra shares as a percentage of the ntunber
of shares in the gross offering, sund underwriting spiread for
issues with and without extra comjjensation.
The device used to test these characteristics was a
"t"-test applied to the means of the data for the various
years. In only one of the tests for any of the character-
istics was a significant difference found to exist among the
data. This occurred when comparing the mean vinderwriting
spread for a group of I965 issues without extra compensation
with the 1968 group that included non-cash extras. All other
tests of these characteristics failed to show a significant
difference, indicating little change in the underwriting
process, at least insofar as these characteristics were
concerned.
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Conclusions
One of the first things that might be learned from this
study is that non-cash underwriting compensation is indeed a
cyclical phenomenon in the securities markets. Its use is ex-
panded during those periods of acknowledged speculation when
the supply of new issues does not seem sufficient to satisfy
the demands of investors and these shares are expected to reach
quick premiums over their issue price. The practice of issuing
warrants and cheap stock declines markedly, however, in slack
periods when there are few new issues and those mainly of a more
stable, mature character. As one would expect the basic
nature of secxirities trading to remain the same, then one could
also expect that the use of extra compensation would continue
to display its historic pattern,
; Whether non-cash extras are a frequent occurrence or not
is also influenced by economic and behavioral factors that are
a part of the relationship between the underwriter and the
issuer, Ceirtainly no one is more anxious to receive the pro-
ceeds of an offering than the issuer. These funds may be
critical to expansion or continued operation of his business. In
the case of most new issues of common stock, this is the com-
pany's first experience with the capital markets. The combin-
ation of lack of expertise and the pressure for new funds may
make it all too easy for the issuer to sweeten the pot for the
underwriter without giving much thought to the implications
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for the future financing of the firm and the possible effects
on the company's earnings per share. The underwriter, on the
other hand, can hardly view each potential offering with the
same degree of importance as the issuer. He can be more de-
tached and try to strike a harder bargain with the issuer. He
has the advantage of being experienced in an area where the
issuer may be a novice.
This view of the underwriting relationship, one that tends
to view the situation as a power relationship or a game between
adversaries, is not the tjrpical one nor the one that is fostered
by the brokerage community. A "game theory** approach, however,
may better explain the development and continued use of non-
cash extras such as securities, refusal rights, and expense
allowances. The fact that many forms of compensation exist
makes possible the use of many different "strategies" in nego-
tiating the underwriting agreements. It also takes better
account of the differences in bargaining posture that exist
between the underwriter and the issuer, or at least allows that
differences may exist.
Another general conclusion of the study would be that extra
compensation is unlikely to be a source of substantial benefit to
the underwriter. Given the results of the 1^*5 qualified issues
with extras in the I965-I968 period, only a small percentage of
the extras granted during that period were found to be profitable

15
to the imderwriter. In only a few offerings did the extras
turn out to "be extremely pixjfit&ble for the underwriter, at
least in comparison with the amounts that he received from
cash compensation. But while the possibilities of large
returns are small, it may be noted that the risks taken Toy
the underwriters are, in some cases, not very great either.
The risk of not being able to sell the entire issue at the
public offering price may be small for "hot issues", and in
all cases the underwriter has advance indications of his
clients' interest before he signs the underwriting agreement.
Also, the underwriter normally does not have large amounts
of money tied up in these extras. The general relationship
of risk and return seems to hold in this area as well» low
risks do not provide great returns.
One of the purposes of the study was to determine if
there were grounds for criticiz-'ng underwriters for abuses
in the use of extra compensation. On the whole, evidence
for such a conclusion appears to be lacking. Underwriters
did not consistently benefit to any great degree from the
extra compensation that they received. In a few Instances
huge profits were made from this form of compensation. But,
when one considers the results in relation to the large
nvimber of underwriters and issuers involved, the experience
*>.r/ 1 i '*"': i^f-'X' * ••'
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does not appear to be more than random.
Certainly the aTaiises In the area of non-cash extras
do not seem to warrant the calls for investigation and the
expenditvires of resources for additional studies and infor-
mation that are heard, when the securities markets "begin to
heat up. Looking at the natiur* of the various extras, it
seems clear that cheap stock is the most objectionable,
Pfeying different prices for the same commodity is a sitiiation
that offends more than a few individuals. An improvement
CO Id be made in the whole underwriting process if cheap
stock were declared illegal and the use of options and
warrants made subject to national regulations similar to
those of the Midwest Securities Commissioners. This policy
ml^t also be Implemeiited by treat Jjtig cheap stock much more
stringently for income tax purposes, although a simple ban
on the device would be more efficient.
The fact that "extras" of any kind exist should in some
sense be objectionable , at l^ast to govemiaerit and other
regulatory bodies. Vihy cannot all of the costs of an issue,
including a fair profit for the linderwriter, be met in the
form of cash compensation, even if it represented a high
percentage of the gross offering? The fact that these
extras are used so widely, especially at certain times, may
be some indication that the rsgu3Ations and standards,
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particularly of the NASD, are unrealistic. Realistic or not,
>ihen coBpensation takes complicated forms it becomes more
difficult to judge its falmeas and reasonableness, and it
becomes more difficult, if not impossible, to regulate its
use. The NASD might try to discoiiraga the use of these
extras by adjusting its "reasonable" levels of cash com-
pensation if need be. Pezhaps its standards are not
diverse enough to evaluate the underwritings of small,
unseasoned companies where the underviriter may indeed face
unusual risks. In any case, a straightforward treatment of
compensation would be much preferred to the circuitous
paths that many undersfriters now attempt to follow.

FOarNQTES
This paper is a sujiunary of the author's doctoral
dissertation completed at Northwestern University in September,
1971.
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U.S. , Congress, House, Report of Special Stud^ of Securities
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Gonuaission . 88th Congress,
Ist Session, April 3. 1963» House Document 95, P&rt I, Chapter IV.
^Irwin Friend et al. , Investment Banking and the New Issues
Market (Cleveland, Ohioi The World Publishing Company, 19^?).
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